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Abstract
This study investigates factors influencing offer premiums from the perspective of
misvaluation between an acquirer and the market with two sub-samples of TSE１-listed cor-
porations and NonTSE１-listed corporations as target firms using data from４０５tender offers
made in Japan between１９９７and２０１３.
The main findings of this study are as follows. First, the offer premium has a posi-
tive and statistically significant relationship with the misvaluation variable based on all listed
corporations for the TSE１sub-sample. On the other hand, there is no significant relationship
between the offer premium and the two versions of the misvaluation variable.
Second, the risk-free rate of return has a negative and statistically significant rela-
tionship with the offer premium for the TSE１ sub-group, and market capitalization value,
and price-to-book value are negatively and significantly related to the offer premium for sub-
groups of both TSE１and NonTSE１.
These findings imply that the acquirer carefully identifies the indexes regarding
the valuation of a target firm and the conditions of the capital market before deciding the of-
fer price to achieve an adequate balance between eliciting shareholders’tendering and re-
straining acquisition costs.
＊ The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number２３５３０４４２and
１６K０３８７７.
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１. Introduction
Corporate acquisitions are one of the typical phenomena in a capitalist economy.
Since the mid-１９９０s, acquisitions have become common in Japan, where recently over２，０００
acquisitions are completed in each year. In Japan, acquirers who have an intention to ac-
quire more than one-third of the outstanding shares of publicly held corporations have to
conduct a tendering process.
Usually, the offer price of the tender is higher than the market share price of the
target firm before the announcement of the offer in order to induce shareholders to tender
their shares to the offer. The difference between the offer price and the share price is called
the“bid premium,”“takeover premium,”or“offer premium１.”Offer premiums are usually
expressed as the ratio of the difference to the share price.
This study examines factors that affect offer premiums in Japan from the perspec-
tive of the valuation differences of the target firms between the acquirer and the market.
Presumably, acquirers consider the market valuation to decide the offer price strategically
in order both to motivate shareholders to tender their shares and to control the acquisition
cost of purchasing the shares. This derives a hypothesis that offer premiums partially repre-
sent the divergence of the valuation of the target firms between the two, or the misvalu-
ation by the market, along with the work of Dong et al.（２００６）. This is a new approach to
investigate the determinants of bid premiums for acquisitions of Japanese corporations.
This study is structured as follows: Section ２ reviews previous studies; Section ３
presents the data and the methodology; Section４provides the empirical results; and Section
５presents the conclusions.
２. Previous Studies
Many prior studies examine the determinants of bid premiums empirically using
US acquisition samples. Ferris et al.（１９７７）first studied the premiums on５０cash tender of-
fers in the United States during １９７４-１９７５ to reveal that a higher soliciting fee and lower
toehold were significantly related to the premium. After them, numerous researchers have
１ We use“offer premium（s）”as the difference hereinafter because the focus of this paper is tender offers.
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been studying the determining factors from various perspectives. The main independent
variables employed and found to be significant using regression analyses were the deal char-
acteristics２, the financial conditions of the acquirer and target firm３, the conditions of the
market for corporate control４, the corporate governance conditions of the acquirer and tar-
get firm５, the differences in the size and scope of the acquirer and target firm６, the condi-
tions of stock market prices and of the target firm’s shares７, and the differences between
the acquirer’s and target firm’s market valuations or between the target firm’s market valu-
ations and the industry average８.
Moreover, several studies take the market valuation of the target firms as the inde-
pendent variables in the regression analysis of the acquisition premiums. Varaiya（１９８７）re-
ports that takeover premiums have a significantly positive relationship with the ratios of the
industry average of market-to-book ratios of target firms. Moeller（２００５）shows that take-
over premiums are significantly negatively related to the ratio of market value of equity of
the target firm to the bidder. Betton et al.（２００８）reveal that the ratios of book-to-market
value of target firms that exceed the industry median are significantly positively related to
the initial offer premiums. Koch et al.（２０１２）show that the relationship between the acquisi-
tion offer premiums and the ratios of book value of equity to market value of the target
firms is significantly positive. Alexandridis et al.（２０１３）and Dimopoulos and Sacchetto
２ Ferris et al.（１９７７）; Walkling and Edmeister（１９８５）; Jahera et al.（１９８５）; Varaiya（１９８７）; Kaufman（１９８８）;
Slusky and Caves（１９８９）; Haunschild（１９９４）; Betton and Eckbo（２０００）; Officer（２００３）; Ayers et al.（２００３）;
Moeller（２００５）; Betton et al.（２００８）; Bargeron（２０１２）; Koch et al.（２０１２）; Li（２０１３）; Song et al.（２０１３）; Alex-
andridis et al.（２０１３）; Humphery-Jenner and Powell（２０１４）, whose samples consisted of ４５ countries, includ-
ing the United States; Dimopoulos and Sacchetto（２０１４）; Huang et al.（２０１４）; Betton et al.（２０１４）.
３ Walkling and Edmeister（１９８５）; Varaiya（１９８７）; Kaufman（１９８８）; Slusky and Caves（１９８９）; Hayward and
Hambrick（１９９７）; Betton and Eckbo（２０００）; Officer（２００３）; Ayers et al.（２００３）; Moeller（２００５）; Betton et al.
（２００８）; Bargeron（２０１２）; Li（２０１３）; Dimopoulos and Sacchetto（２０１４）.
４ Jahera et al.（１９８５）; Kaufman（１９８８）; Slusky and Caves（１９８９）; Haunschild（１９９４）; Hayward and Ham-
brick（１９９７）; Betton and Eckbo（２０００）; Ayers et al.（２００３）; Moeller（２００５）; Betton et al.（２００８）; Koch et al.
（２０１２）; Alexandridis et al.（２０１３）; Levi et al.（２０１４）; Dimopoulos and Sacchetto（２０１４）.
５ Ferris et al.（１９７７）; Varaiya（１９８７）; Slusky and Caves（１９８９）; Haunschild（１９９４）; Hayward and Hambrick
（１９９７）; Cotter et al.（１９９７）; Moeller（２００５）; Bargeron（２０１２）; Humphery-Jenner and Powell（２０１４）, whose
samples consisted of４５countries, including the United States.
６ Betton and Eckbo（２０００）; Officer（２００３）; Li（２０１３）; Bargeron（２０１２）; Alexandridis et al.（２０１３）.
７ Ayers et al.（２００３）; Moeller（２００５）; Rosen（２００６）; Betton et al.（２００８）; Petmezas（２００９）; Bouwman et al.
（２００９）; Baker et al.（２０１２）, Bargeron（２０１２）, Alexandridis et al.（２０１３）; Li（２０１３）.
８ Varaiya（１９８７）; Officer（２００３）; Moeller（２００５）; Betton et al.（２００８）; Koch et al.（２０１２）; Alexandridis et al.
（２０１３）; Humphery-Jenner and Powell（２０１４）, whose samples consisted of ４５ countries, including the United
States; Dimopoulos and Sacchetto（２０１４）.
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（２０１４）find that the acquisition premiums have a significantly negative relationship with the
market-to-book equity ratios of the target firms.
At the same time, previous studies using a sample of Japanese corporations suc-
ceeded to find some factors affecting bid premiums in relation to market valuation９. Among
these, Inoue et al.（２０１０）report that the dummy for target firms’ratio of share price-to-
book value（PBR）＜ １ is a significantly positive determinant of bid premiums while PBR
conditional on target firm’s PBR ＜１ is a significantly negative determinant, whereas Hana-
mura et al.（２０１１）report that a target firms’ratio of book value to share price（B／P）is a
significantly positive determinant. These results imply that bid premiums might be influ-
enced by the differences in the valuation of target firms between acquirers and the market.
However, these studies do not represent direct evidence of the existence of these differ-
ences.
On the other hand, Bundo（２０１７）finds some relationships between offer premiums
and the valuations of target firms in terms of both market valuation and estimated valuation
using a sample of Japanese tender offers. Bundo（２０１７）uses shareholder cost of capital
based on share prices of all listed corporations, which might need to be treated more finely.
This study investigates the relationships between offer premiums and estimated valuations
of target firms using two versions of shareholder cost of capital. To the best of the author’s
knowledge, the method used in this study is novel１０.
３. Methodology and Sample
３.１Methodology and Variables
This study investigates the hypothesis that differences in the valuation of the tar-
get firms between acquirers and the market affect the offer premiums of Japanese tender
offers. Therefore, we examine the relationship between the offer premiums and valuation
differences. This implies the main variables employed in this study are PREM, the ratio of
９ Bundo（２００５）; Hattori（２００８）; Inoue（２００８）; Kruse and Suzuki（２０１０）; Inoue et al.（２０１０）; Hanamura
（２０１１）; Bundo（２０１３,２０１４a,２０１４b,２０１４c,２０１５,２０１６）.
１０ This concept is referred to in the comment by Mr. Tohru Furuyama to the author’s presentation at the
８５th Annual Conference of Society for the Economic Studies of Securities held at Meiji University, September
１８,２０１６.
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the offer price to the volume-weighted average share price of target firm, and MISVAL, the
differences in the valuations of target firm between the acquirers and the market.
Valuations of the target firm are further decomposed in order to identify which
components of the relevant variables affect the offer premiums. These components are as
follow: V, the estimated capitalized value of shareholder equity of the target firm using the
residual income model; B, the book value of shareholder equity of the target firm; FNI, the
value of the forecasted net income of the ongoing fiscal year t disclosed by the target firm;
RIV, the estimated capitalized value of the residual income of the target firm; r, the share-
holder cost of capital of the target firm using CAPM; rf, the risk-free rate of return; MP, the
market premium; , the coefficient of the MP; MKTCAP, the market capitalization of the tar-
get firm; PBR, the ratio of market value-to-book value of the target firm. r, MP, and  have
two versions. re, MPe, and e are based on the entire universe of all listed corporations. rs, MPs,
and s are based on the separated samples of listed corporations of the TSE１（Tokyo Stock
Exchange first section market）or NonTSE１（the other markets except TSE１）, which are
separately matched for the listed market types of the target firm. According to this treat-
ment, V and MISVAL also have two versions, Ve and Vs, and MISVALe and MISVALs, based on
re and rs, respectively. RIVs is based on rs. The definitions of these variables are shown in
Table１.
V is estimated as follows:
V＝B＋FNI－rB１＋r ＋
FNI－rB
（１＋r）r
＝B＋FNI－rBr
This expression presumes that the value of the target firm is estimated as the sin-
gle year residual income based on the forecasted net income of the ongoing fiscal year. This
implies the net income as a constant value that continues forever. Employing the residual in-
come model to estimate V is based on the growing body of empirical studies of the residual
income model in Japan１１ in the wake of Ohlson’s（１９９５）seminal study. Among them, Fujii
１１ For instance, Inoue（１９９９）; Yamamoto（１９９９）; Ohta（２０００）; Okumura and Yoshida（２０００）; Watabe et al.
（２００１）; Chizawa（２００２）; Takehara and Suda（２００４）; Yanai（２００４）; Nakano et al.（２００５）; Oshika（２００５）;
Nishio and Nakano（２００６）; Muramiya（２００８）; Fujii and Hanamura（２００９）; Shintani（２００９）; Matsumura
（２０１１）; Ohta et al.（２０１２）.
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and Yamamoto（１９９９）and Nishio and Nakano（２００６）report that the residual income model
is superior to other methods such as the Discounted Cash Flow model for an empirical
study of the similarity between estimated and historical shareholder equity.
Shareholder cost of capital r is estimated using the method introduced by Ohta et
al.（２０１２）. However, in this study, the value of the market equity premium is calculated by
the market capitalization weighted average of the total shareholder return of all listed firms
of all stock exchanges, all listed firms of TSE１, or all NonTSE１-listed firms in Japan, includ-
ing financial instifutions and excluding investment corporations, since １９８６. This is in con-
trast with Ohta et al.（２０１２）who use the market capitalization weighted average of the to-
tal shareholder return of all listed firms of the first and second section of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange, including financial institutions, since １９７７. This is because ５２．５% of the target
firms of tender offers from １９９７ to ２０１３ in Japan listed on the market is other than in the
first and second sections of the TSE.
This study performs three types of analyses: the univariate test, simple regression
analysis, and multiple regression analysis.
The univariate test analyzes differences in the mean and median of the variables in
the sub-groups of the sub-samples mentioned above. This study deals with the positive and
negative offer premium sub-samples separately as their distributions are thought to be dif-
ferent. In addition, each sub-sample is sorted by descending order of PREM and divided into
three sub-groups: the upper one-third（“high”）, the middle one-third（“middle”）, and the
lower one-third（“low”）. The purpose of this arrangement is to detect the statistically sig-
nificant differences of“high－low”mean and／or median of the variables, implying a signifi-
cant relationship between the offer premiums and the other variables relevant to the valu-
ations of target firms.
The purpose of simple regression analysis is to distinguish the independent vari-
ables that have a statistically significant positive or negative relationship with the dependent
variable PREM.
Multiple regression analysis is conducted to identify the independent variables that
have the greatest influence of the ones with statistically significant relationships to PREM
detected in the simple regression analysis and to identify regression models with high ex-
planatory power. In this analysis, the independent variables are selected from among the
statistically significant variables used in the previous simple regression analysis; however,
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some variables can be introduced to the model when the explanatory power of the model in-
creases.
The natural logarithm of the variables V, B, FNI, RIV, and MKTCAP are taken in
the following analyses（※ is attached to the variables in the tables of and after Table２）.
Table １. Definitions of the Variables
symbol simplizedsymbol definition
PREMi PREM
the ratio（“offer premium”）of the offer price to the volume-weighted average stock price of the target firm i for the
period of six months excluding the last ２０ trading days before the announcement of the offer, calculated by（OP-
AVP）／AVP.
OP: tender offer price.
AVP: the volume-weighted average stock price of the target firm before the announcement of the offer for the period
of six months excluding the ２０ trading days before the announcement.
Bi，t―１ B the book value of shareholder’s equity of the target firm i at the year t-１, the fiscal year of which the financial state-ment of the target firm i has been already disclosed（１million yen）.
MKTCAPi MKTCAP
the value of market capitalization of the target firm i calculated by multipling the value of closing share price of the
target firm i at the latest disclosed day before the announcement of the offer when the forecasted eanings of the on-
going fiscal year t by the target firm i is disclosed（or at the next trading day, if the latest disclosed day is not a trad-
ing day）by the numbers of the share of the target firm i at the latest day when the forecasted net income of the on-
going fiscal year t is disclosed before the announcement of the offer（or at the next trading day, if the latest day is
not a trading day）（１million yen）.
FNIi，t FNI
the value of forecasted net income（or the multiple value of the disclosed forecasted net income per share by the
numbers of share of the target firm i at the latest disclosed day before the announcement of the offer when the fore-
casted eanings of the ongoing fiscal year t by the target firm i is disclosed（or at the next trading day, if the latest dis-
closed day is not a trading day）, if the forecasted net income is not available and the disclosed forecasted net in-
come per share is available）of the ongoing fiscal year t disclosed by the target firm i at the latest disclose date be-
fore the announcement of the offer（１million yen）.
rfi，m rf the risk-free rate of return of the target firm i at the last trading day of the previous month m before the offer is oc-curred, using the rate of return of newly issued ten-year Japanese government bond.
MPi，m，e MPe
the averaged market premium culculated by market return of target firm i at the trading day of the previous month m
before the offer is occurred minus rfi，m based on the entire universe of listed corporations, average periods of which
are the one from Feb. １９８６ to m.
MPi，m，s MPs
the averaged market premium culculated by market return of target firm i at the trading day of the previous month m
before the offer is occurred minus rfi，m based on the separated samples of listed corporations of TSE１ or NonTSE１,
average periods of which are the one from Oct. １９８６ to m.
i，m，e e the estimated coefficient value for MPi，m，e of the CAPM equation for re estimation based on the entire universe oflisted corporations.
i，m，s s the estimated coefficient value for MPi，m，s of the CAPM equation for rs estimation based on the separated samples oflisted corporations of TSE１ or NonTSE１.
ri，m，e re the shareholder’s cost of capital of the target firm i at the last trading day of the previous month m before the offer isoccurred based on CAPM（Capitarl Asset Pricing Model）, basend on the entire universe of listed corporations.
ri，m，s rs
the shareholder’s cost of capital of the target firm i at the last trading day of the previous month m before the offer is
occurred based on CAPM, based on the separated samples of listed corporations of TSE１（Tokyo Stock Exchange
first section market）or NonTSE１（the other markets of TSE１）.
RIVi，t，s／ri，m，s RIVs the estimated capitalized value of the residual income of the target firm i（１ million yen）, calculated by（FNIi，t-ri，m，sBi，t―１）／ri，m，s.
Vi，t，e Ve
the estimated capitalized value of shareholder’s equity using the residual income model（or so-called“Edward-Bell-
Ohlson model”）calculated by the value of the forecasted net income of the ongoing fiscal year t disclosed by the tar-
get firm i at the latest disclose date before the announcement of the offer（１ million yen）based on re, calculated by
Bi，t―１ ＋（FNIi，t-ri，m，e Bi，t―１）／ri，m，e.
Vi，t，s Vs
the estimated capitalized value of shareholder’s equity using the residual income model（or so-called“Edward-Bell-
Ohlson model”）calculated by the value of the forecasted net income of the ongoing fiscal year t disclosed by the tar-
get firm i at the latest disclose date before the announcement of the offer（１ million yen）based on rs, calculated by
Bi，t―１ ＋（FNIi，t-ri，m，s Bi，t―１）／ri，m，s.
PBRi PBR the ratio of the value of market capitalization of the target firm i at the latest disclosed day before the announcementof the offer to the book value of shareholder’s equity of the target firm i at the year t-１, calculated by MKTCAPi／Bt―１
MISVALi，t，e MISVALe
the misvaluation ratio of the difference between the value of market capitalization and the estimated capitalized value
of shareholder’s equity using the residual income model of the target firm i at the latest disclosed day before the an-
nouncement of the offer based on re, calculated by（MKTCAPi-Vi，t，e）／Vi，t，e, or the largest value of the calculated values
is employed when the value of forecasted net income is zero.
MISVALi，t，s MISVALs
the misvaluation ratio of the difference between the value of market capitalization and the estimated capitalized value
of shareholder’s equity using the residual income model of the target firm i at the latest disclosed day before the an-
nouncement of the offer based on rs, calculated by（MKTCAPi-Vi，t，s）／Vi，t，s, or the largest value of the calculated values
is employed when the value of forecasted net income is zero.
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３.２ Sample and Data
The sample used in this study comprises target firms for which tender offers com-
menced between April １９９７ and December ２０１３. The original sample comprises ７０４ offers.
Additionally, the following cases are excluded:（１）the offer premium is negative;（２）the
closing date of the preceding tender offer to the concerned target firm by other bidders is
within one year before the commencement date of the concerned offer;（３）the share prices
of the target firm for the６０months before the announcement of the offer are not available;
（４）the announcement date of the concerned offer occurs six months or earlier of the com-
mencement date of the offer;（５）the proxy fight relevant to the target firm occurs before
the announcement of the concerned offer;（６）the forecasted net income of the ongoing fis-
cal year of the target firm is not available, or negative and large because of payback to the
customers of illegal overpayment of interests in non-banking industries; and（７）it is a two-
tier offer where the offer price of the concerned offer is different from the purchase price
for exchanging the shares of the non-tendering shareholders of the target firm with the
shares of the bidder in the scheduled merger after completing the offer. The sample com-
prised ４０５ tender offers of positive PREM after this exclusion to yield １３０ for TSE１ sub-
group and２７５NonTSE１ sub-group. Outlier exclusion is not conducted. The descriptive sta-
tistics of the both sub-samples are shown in panel A of Table２.
Data for the sample’s tender offers are collected from the public documents of EDI-
NET. The data for other aspects of the analyses are taken from the Nikkei Financial-
QUEST.
Panel B of Table２ shows the results of difference test of mean and median for the
two sub-groups. The results for PREM, MISVALs, e, s, rs, MKTCAP, Ve, Vs, B , FNI, RIVs, PBR
are statistically significant for both mean and median. MISVALe and MPs are statistically sig-
nificant for either mean or median. Merely three of１８variables, rf, MPe, and re, are not statis-
tically significant. These results indicate the two sub-groups need to be analyzed separately.
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４. Results
４.１ Univariate Test
Tables３ and４ show the results of the difference tests of mean and median of sub-
samples sorted by the order of offer premium for both TSE１ and NonTSE１ sub-groups.
Samples are sorted by the descending order of PREM and divided into three sub-samples by
the upper one-third（“high”）, middle one-third（“middle”）, and lower one-third（“low”）of
each of the two sub-groups. The means and medians of the three sub-samples and the three
versions of differences,“high－middle,”“middle－low,”and“high－low”are shown below.
Additionally, on the bottom of the tables, arrow signs are shown.“↑”and“↑↑”
denote that the means／medians are ascending from high through middle to low consistently,
implying that high mean／median ＜ middle mean／median ＜ low mean／median. Conversely,
“↓”and“↓↓”denote that the means／medians are descending from high through middle
to low consistently, implying that high mean／median ＞ middle mean／median ＞ low mean／
median.“↑↑”and“↓↓”denote the differences of mean／median for“high－low”are of
statistical significance at the level of ５% or １%, and“↑”and“↓”denote the other. These
signs help identify the results of both tables.
Regarding TSE１, shown in Table３, consistent relationship signs of double arrows
for both mean and median are found for e, rf, MPe, MPs, and rs. These variables are thought
to be powerful factors that affect the offer premium. For MISVALe and MISVALs, the results
are different for each. That is, no strong and significant differences are not found for MIS-
VALe for either the mean or the median; on the other hand, the“high－low”difference and
double ascending arrow sign（“↑↑”）are shown for MISVALs for the median. At the same
time, the signs of mean and median of differences for MISVALe and MISVALs are the con-
trary, i.e., positive for MISVALe and negative for MISVALs.
These results imply, first, that the relationship between the offer premium and
misevaluation is altered by the calculation method of shareholder cost of capital, and that
the acquirer employs the cost of capital calculated not based on the entire stock market, but
on the individual market where the target firm is listed. Second, they imply that the offer
premium becomes lower as the size of negative misevaluation shrinks and that the acquirer
tends to make a higher offer price when the target firm is more undervalued. In relation to
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this implication, the results of PBR for the median are interesting. The mean and median of
“high”are less than one and the mean and median of“low”are greater than one for PBR.
This implies that the market value is under the book value of the target firm when the offer
premium is high and when the market value is over the book value, the offer premium is low.
The results of rf, MPe, and MPs are concordantly double ascending arrows. This im-
plies that the acquirer adjusts the offer premium downward to the risk-free rate and moves
the market premium upward. The reason behind this might be that the acquirer sees
through an overheated economy and market, and presses down the offer premium at the
risk of decreasing shareholders’tendering１２.
Combining these results discussed allows us to recognize that the acquirer care-
fully observes the capital market index, such as the risk-free rate or market premium and
market valuation of the target firm such as PBR, and judges the adequate level of offer
price to realize the balance between eliciting shareholder tendering and restraining acquisi-
tion costs１３.
The results of re and rs are almost identical for the mean and median of ascending
as PREM rank, going down with a statistical significance at the １% level for“high－low.”
This finding is not easy to interpret. If the ascending of re and rs influences the offer pre-
mium via V, then the results of Ve and Vs should be descending with PREM. However, as
seen in Table３, this is not the case. Moreover, the correlation coefficients between Vs and rs
and between Vs and re are significantly positive（results table not shown in the paper）. An-
other interpretation could be that re and rs reflect MKTCAP ; that is, low（high）re and rs
could correspond with high（low）market capitalization value. As seen in Table３, this is
again not the case and the correlation coefficients between re and MKTCAP and between rs
and MKTCAP are significantly positive（results table not shown in the paper）. Therefore,
the relationship between the cost of capital r of the target firm and the offer premium
would be an important topic to investigate in detail.
The results of e and s are different from each other, significantly descending for e
for the mean and median while not significantly ascending for s. In the CAPM equation,  is
one of the determinants of shareholder cost of capital. However, the results of re and rs do
１２ The acquirer also might limit the total acquisition cost of purchase the shares of the target firm even
when the market is overheated.
１３ This is consistent with the findings of Bundo（２０１４a,２０１４b,２０１４c,２０１５,２０１６）.
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not seem to be influenced by e and s as shown in Table３; nevertheless, the correlation co-
efficients between e and re, between s and re, and between e and rs are statistically significant
（results table not shown in the paper）. This would also be an important topic to examine.
As to NonTSE１shown in Table４, consistent relationship signs of double arrows for
both the mean and median are found for rf, MPe, re, MKTCAP, and PBR of which rf and MPe
are in common with TSE１. Double arrow signs, directions of which are contrary to those of
TSE１, are not found.
For MISVALe and MISVALs, the results are interchanged between TSE１ and
NonTSE１; that is, the“high-low”difference and double ascending arrow sign（“↑↑”）are
shown for MISVALe for median; on the other hand, no strong and significant differences are
not found for MISVALs for the mean or median. Besides this finding of MISVAL, the results
of MP and r show similar comparisons. The ascending relationship with PREM exists in
both MPe and MPs; however, the mean and median differences of“high-low”are statistically
significant for MPe. On the other hand, only the median difference is statistically significant
for MPs. Likewise, the ascending relationship with PREM exists in both re and rs, and mean
and median differences of“high-low”are statistically significant for re; on the other hand, the
mean and median differences are not statistically significant for rs. These similar findings im-
ply that for NonTSE１, the offer premium is related to the indexes using the samples of the
entire universe of all listed corporations more than the ones of listed corporations of markets
other than TSE１.
The direction of the arrows of re and rs（that is, ascending）is same as that of TSE１,
implying that the mechanism of the relationship with offer premium discussed earlier exists
in the NonTSE１sub-sample. On the other hand, the results of e and s are not incompatible
with each other and are different from those of TSE１.
The results of MKTCAP and PBR are almost similar with those of TSE１. The slight
differences from TSE１ are that the ascending relationship with offer premium is found for
the median of MKTCAP for NonTSE１ and for the mean of PBR for NonTSE１, implying a
stronger relationship both between offer premium and market valuation and between offer
premium and book value of the NonTSE１target firm than of the TSE１target firm.
These results generally indicate that the relationships between offer premium and
the variables taken in the paper are almost identical for the two sub-groups, TSE１ and
NonTSE１, based on the univariate tests.
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４.２ Simple Regression Analyses
The results of the simple regression analyses on PREM are shown in Table５. For
the TSE１ sub-group, among the variables with consistent and statistically significant signs
for the mean or median at the １% or ５% significance level in the univariate test shown in
Table３, e, rf , MPe, MPs, re, rs, MKTCAP, and PBR remain as the variables with the same
signs in this analysis. Among these variables, rf, MPe, MPs, re, and rs are statistically significant
at the１% or５% level again in this analysis. MISVALs, e, MKTCAP, and PBR are weakly sig-
nificant or not significant in the analysis. In turn, the result of MISVALe is positive and statis-
tically significant in the analysis, though it shows no statistical significance in the univariate
test. Additionally, the results of Vs and RIVs are negative and statistically significant in the
analysis, though they show no statistical significance in the univariate test.
For the NonTSE１ sub-group, among the variables with consistent and statistically
significant signs for the mean or median at the１% or５% significance level in the univariate
test shown in Table４, MISVALe, rf, MPe, MPs, re, rs, MKTCAP, RIVs, and PBR remain as the
variables with the same signs in this analysis. Among these variables, rf, MPe, re, MKTCAP,
RIVs, and PBR are of statistically significance at the １% of ５% level again in this analysis.
MISVALe, MPs, and rs are not significant in the analysis.
Comparing the results of TSE１ and NonTSE１, common variables are identified. rf,
MPe, re, MKTCAP, and RIV are related positively to the offer premium with statistical signifi-
cance at the １% or ５% level. They might be the fundamental factors influencing the offer
premium regardless of the market in which the target firm is listed. Differing variables are
MISVALe, with a positive relationship, and MPs, rs, and RIVs, with a negative relationship with
offer premium for the TSE１ sub-group, and are PBR with negative relationship with the of-
fer premium for the NonTSE１sub-group.
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Table ５. Results of Simple Regression Analyses on Tender Offer Premiums
TSE１ NonTSE１
Const.
（t-stat.）
（p-val.）
Coef.
（t-stat.）
（p-val.）
adj. R２ AIC n
Const.
（t-stat.）
（p-val.）
Coef.
（t-stat.）
（p-val.）
adj. R２ AIC n
MISVALe
０．３２５＊＊＊
（１５．５８１）
（０．０００）
０．０２６＊＊
（２．３９８）
（０．０１８）
０．０２０ ―０．１０４ １３０ ０．４３９＊＊＊
（２０．９３９）
（０．０００）
―０．００５
（―０．３６４）
（０．７１６）
―０．００３ ０．８３８ ２７５
MISVALs
０．３０５＊＊＊
（７．４３０）
（０．０００）
―０．０４５
（―０．９２３）
（０．３５８）
０．０１３ ―０．０９７ １３０ ０．４５６＊＊＊
（１２．９０７）
（０．０００）
０．０１４
（０．９９７）
（０．３２０）
０．００２ ０．８３３ ２７５
e
０．３１１＊＊＊
（１３．６２７）
（０．０００）
０．０９２＊
（１．７５５）
（０．０８２）
０．０１２ ―０．０９６ １３０ ０．４１１＊＊＊
（１３．４２５）
（０．０００）
０．０６５
（１．１３４）
（０．２５８）
―０．０００ ０．８３５ ２７５
s
０．３５３＊＊＊
（７．９９５）
（０．０００）
―０．０９７
（―０．３７８）
（０．７０６）
―０．００７ ―０．０７７ １３０ ０．４１９＊＊＊
１１．０９３
０．０００
０．０２２
（０．５８７）
（０．５５７）
―０．００２ ０．８３７ ２７５
rf
０．６３５＊＊＊
（８．９９４）
（０．０００）
―２６０．０００＊＊＊
（―４．６６６）
（０．０００）
０．１０４ ―０．１９４ １３０ ０．６４４＊＊＊
（６．６５６）
（０．０００）
―１８８．４１３＊＊
（―２．１２９）
（０．０３４）
０．０１６ ０．８１８ ２７５
MPe
０．３９６＊＊＊
（１３．１９９）
（０．０００）
―７８．５６３＊＊＊
（―４．０４７）
（０．０００）
０．１００ ―０．１８９ １３０ ０．４６０＊＊＊
（１９．６８２）
（０．０００）
―４０．９１４＊＊＊
（―２．７１７）
（０．００７）
０．０１３ ０．８２１ ２７５
MPs
０．３０８＊＊＊
（１８．８８４）
（０．０００）
―１３．８５８＊＊＊
（―４．４０２）
（０．０００）
０．１１７ ―０．２０９ １３０ ０．２８３＊＊＊
（３．００３）
（０．００３）
―４０．４６１
（―１．６３１）
（０．１０４）
０．００４ ０．８３１ ２７５
re
０．４７７＊＊＊
（９．４９０）
（０．０００）
―８．７８６＊＊＊
（―３．４７６）
（０．００１）
０．０６４ ―０．１５０ １３０ ０．５２３＊＊＊
（１２．７８０）
（０．０００）
―５．４９１＊＊
（―２．３６５）
（０．０１９）
０．０１１ ０．８２４ ２７５
rs
０．３９８＊＊＊
（１４．０７９）
（０．０００）
―５．８４８＊＊＊
（―４．４１２）
（０．０００）
０．１２９ ―０．２２２ １３０ ０．４２６＊＊＊
（１５．２１１）
（０．０００）
―０．４５２
（―０．６５７）
（０．５１２）
―０．００１ ０．８３６ ２７５
MKTCAP※
０．９４１＊＊
（２．１５４）
（０．０３３）
―０．０２５
（―１．３８５）
（０．１６８）
０．００８ ―０．０９１ １３０ １．８３０＊＊＊
（４．６１９）
（０．０００）
―０．０６２＊＊＊
（―３．６１０）
（０．０００）
０．０３９ ０．７９５ ２７５
Ve※
０．３３２＊＊＊
（１０．９７１）
（０．０００）
０．００１
（０．２１０）
（０．８３４）
―０．００８ ―０．０７６ １３０ ０．４２６＊＊＊
（１５．７０３）
（０．０００）
０．００２
（０．７０７）
（０．４８０）
―０．００２ ０．８３７ ２７５
Vs※
０．３５９＊＊＊
（１５．００８）
（０．０００）
―０．００５＊＊＊
（―２．６５４）
（０．００９）
０．０６３ ―０．１４８ １３０ ０．４２７＊＊＊
（１８．２８８）
（０．０００）
―０．００３
（―１．５８６）
（０．１１４）
０．００４ ０．８３１ ２７５
B※
０．２３０＊＊＊
（０．９６９）
（０．３３５）
０．０１０
（０．４４７）
（０．６５６）
―０．００６ ―０．０７８ １３０ ０．６１６＊＊＊
（５．４９５）
（０．０００）
―０．０２１＊
（―１．７６０）
（０．０８０）
０．００４ ０．８３１ ２７５
FNI※
０．３４１＊＊＊
（１１．００３）
（０．０００）
―０．００１
（―０．１７０）
（０．８６５）
―０．００８ ―０．０７６ １３０ ０．４２９＊＊＊
（１５．１４０）
（０．０００）
０．００１９８
（０．４７２）
（０．６３８）
―０．００３ ０．８３８ ２７５
RIVs※
０．３４９＊＊＊
（１５．６４９）
（０．０００）
―０．００５＊＊
（―２．４１１）
（０．０１７）
０．０４８ ―０．１３３ １３０ ０．４１４＊＊＊
（１８．８６５）
（０．０００）
―０．００５＊＊＊
（―２．７３７）
（０．００７）
０．０１４ ０．８２１ ２７５
PBR
０．３７３＊＊＊
（１２．８３９）
（０．０００）
―０．０２８＊
（―１．９５６）
（０．０５３）
０．０２１ ―０．１０５ １３０ ０．５１８＊＊＊
（１８．６０６）
（０．０００）
―０．０８１＊＊＊
（―５．５１１）
（０．０００）
０．０５０ ０．７８３ ２７５
＊＊＊, ＊＊, and ＊ denote the statistical significance at the level of １%, ５%, and １０%. ※ denotes the natural loga-
rithm. P-values are for two-tailed. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance are em-
ployed in the regression models.
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４.３Multiple Regression Analyses
Multiple regression analyses are performed using the independent variables that
are statistically significant in the simple regression analyses shown in Table５ and are not
inconsistent with the signs of the relevant values of the univariate tests shown in Tables３
and４. The results of the multiple regression analyses on PREM are shown in Table６, which
shows each two models with the lowest AIC（Akaike Information Criterion）for the TSE１
and NonTSE１.
For TSE１ sub-group, MISVALe and rf are the powerful factors influencing the offer
premium. MISVALe affects positively and rf has an negative effect on the offer premium. At
the same time, the PBR in Model（１）is changed to MKTCAP and B in Model（２）, implying
that they are almost interchangeable although the AIC of Model（１）is lower than that of
Model（２）. Therefore, the acquirer tends to make the offer price flexibly, taking account of
these factors, when conducting tender offers to the corporation listed in TSE１.
As for the NonTSE１ sub-group, MKTCAP, FNI, RIV, and PBR are the powerful fac-
tors affecting the offer premium. MKTCAP, RIV, and PBR have a negative effect and FNI in-
fluences positively on the offer premium. Model（４）is MISVALs added to Model（３）. The
AIC of Model（４）is slightly lower than that of Model（３）. This indicates that misvaluation is
one of the influencing factors on offer premium for NonTSE１target firm. The sign of the co-
efficient is same as that of MISVALe for TSE１. Interestingly, the common variables between
TSE１ and NonTSE１ are merely MKTCAP and PBR, and the other variables are not com-
mon. This implies that the mechanism of determining the tender offer premium differ ac-
cording to the market where the target firm is listed.
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Table ６. Results of Multiple Regression Analyses on Tender Offer Premiums
TSE１ NonTSE１
（１） （２） （３） （４）
independent
variables Const.
coef.
（t-stat.）
（p-val.）
０．６７４＊＊＊
（９．４３８）
（０．０００）
１．７４３＊＊＊
（３．８５３）
（０．０００）
１．９５０＊＊＊
４．３７１
０．０００
１．９９６＊＊＊
（４．３４９）
（０．０００）
MISVALe
０．０３７＊＊＊
（５．５８７）
（０．０００）
０．０３２＊＊＊
（４．３６６）
（０．０００）
MISVALs
０．０１９
（１．２５２）
（０．２１２）
e
s
rf
―２７８．７５２＊＊＊
（―５．０６２）
（０．０００）
―２５３．７６４＊＊＊
（―４．５００）
（０．０００）
MPe
MPs
re
rs
MKTCAP※
―０．０９３＊＊＊
（―３．６６５）
（０．０００）
―０．０６８＊＊＊
（―３．３９１）
（０．００１）
―０．０６９＊＊＊
（―３．３９１）
（０．００１）
Ve※
Vs※
B※
０．１０８＊＊＊
（３．４５７）
（０．００１）
FNI※
０．０１０＊＊
（２．５３２）
（０．０１２）
０．０１１＊＊＊
（２．６４２）
（０．００９）
RIVs※
―０．００４＊＊
（―２．４８８）
（０．０１３）
―０．００５＊＊
（―２．５６３）
（０．０１１）
PBR
―０．０２８＊＊＊
（―２．８０９）
（０．００６）
―０．０５９＊＊＊
（―４．２１９）
（０．０００）
―０．０５８＊＊＊
（―４．２３２）
（０．０００）
n １３０ １３０ ２７５ ２７５
adj. R２ ０．１６７ ０．１９５ ０．０９０ ０．０９７
AIC ―０．２５２ ―０．２７８ ０．７５１ ０．７４７
F-stat.
p-val.
９．６４９
０．０００
８．８２６
０．０００
７．８１６
０．０００
６．９１１
０．０００
＊＊＊, ＊＊, and ＊ denote the statistical significance at the level of １%, ５%, and １０%. ※ denotes the natural loga-
rithm. P-values are for two-tailed. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance are em-
ployed in the regression models.
―― 経 営 論 集 ――１７８
／■修校了／１２－２８５／本文／ＡＺ２８５Ｉ 2018.03.13 13.40.02 Page 168
５. Conclusion
This study performs a univariate test, simple regression analyses, and multiple re-
gression analyses to investigate factors influencing the offer premium from the perspective
of misvaluation between the acquirer and the market with two sub-samples of TSE１-listed
and NonTSE１-listed corporations as target firms using data from ４０５ tender offers made in
Japan between１９９７and２０１３.
The novel feature of this study is the introduction of two versions in some vari-
ables: one calculated by the data based on the entire universe of all listed corporations and
one based on the individual market where the target firm is listed.
The main findings of this study are as follows. First, the offer premium has the
positive and statistically significant relationship with the misvaluation variable based on the
all listed corporations for the TSE１sub-sample. On the other hand, there is no significant re-
lationship between with the offer premium and the two versions of misvaluation variable.
Second, the risk-free rate of return has a negative and statistically significant rela-
tionship with offer premium for TSE１ sub-group, and market capitalization value and price-
to-book value are negatively and significantly related to the offer premium for sub-groups of
both TSE１and NonTSE１.
These findings imply that the acquirer carefully identifies the indexes regarding
the valuation of the target firm and the conditions of the capital market, and decides the of-
fer price to achieve an adequate balance between eliciting shareholders’tendering and re-
straining acquisition costs.
This study has also been successful by revealing that the effective multi-regression
models on offer premium, including misvaluation variables, differ between the two sub-sam-
ples of TSE１and NonTSE１. However, the causalities among variables with statistical signifi-
cance and the rationale behind them are not resolved. These are topics to be investigated in
the future research.
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